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EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND
INCOME INEQUALITY
DANIEL J. MORRISSEY*
ABSTRACT
This Article explores the connection between exorbitant executive
compensation and the growing income inequality in our country. It discusses the traditional legal attempts to rein in corporate remuneration as
well as the more recent “Say-on-Pay” right given to shareholders in the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act of 2010. The Article concludes that negative stockholder votes can be evidence that directors have breached their
fiduciary duties by granting overly generous pay hikes to their top officials.
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INTRODUCTION
Executive compensation has reached scandalous levels at many public
companies, making it the number one problem in corporate law.1 As a major
factor in the growing income inequality in America, it is even more significantly a threat to the economic well-being of our nation.2 Things were not
this way especially during the widespread prosperity that followed the Second
World War.3 During the last several decades, however, as the living standards
of most Americans have remained stagnant or gone backwards, top corporate pay has grown to outrageous proportions.4 This Article will first present statistical evidence on this soaring remuneration and its consequences
on the general quality of life in our country.5 It will then discuss the classic
legal treatment of this problem under both state corporate law and the federal securities laws,6 and describe why leading scholars and public commentators believe it is inadequate.7
The Article will then address the most current legislative response to this
problem: the Say-on-Pay section of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank).8 This provision requires
all public companies to afford their shareholders a nonbinding advisory vote
on the compensation they pay to their top officials.9 The Article will then
present the results of those plebiscites during 2011, the measure’s first year
of operation. The results have dismayed a number of corporate critics since
the majority of shareholders of only a few firms disapproved of their executives’ pay packages.10
Despite this overall disappointment, more than 50% of the shareholders
did cast negative ballots at firms whose officers were afforded lush compensation despite poor performance.11 When boards did not rescind their
1

See discussion infra Part V.
See infra notes 17–18 and accompanying text.
3
See infra notes 18–21 and accompanying text.
4
See infra notes 22–32 and accompanying text.
5
See discussion infra Parts I–V.
6
See discussion infra Part VI.A–B.
7
See discussion infra Part VI.C.
8
See discussion infra Part VII.
9
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 951, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899 (2010).
10
See discussion infra Part VIII.
11
Edward F. Greene, Say-on-Pay and the Business Judgment Rule, THE HARVARD L.
SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REG. (Nov. 26, 2011, 9:52 AM), http://blogs
.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2011/11/26/say-on-pay-and-the-business-judgment-rule/ (highlighting a few of the over forty companies in which the majority shareholder vote was negative);
see also Teamsters Local 237 Additional Sec. Benefit Fund v. McCarthy, No. 2011-CV-197841,
2
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officers’ compensation packages, stockholders at several of the companies
brought derivative suits citing their “No” votes as evidence that there was
no justification for those pay hikes.12 They therefore alleged that the board
of directors should be held liable for their waste of corporate assets and
breach of their fiduciary duties.13 As of early 2012, one federal court has
sustained such a claim by placing the allegations of excessive pay in the
context of the exorbitant income inequality that it fosters.14
The Article will conclude by pointing out the beneficial effects of such
a judicial decision.15 Such a ruling will not only restrain outlandish corporate remuneration, which is virtually theft from shareholders, but it can also
benefit our society in other ways. If those payments to executives, along
with other sizeable amounts that corporations are now hoarding,16 were
either distributed to shareholders or put to other productive uses, they would
expedite our country’s economic recovery. The economy would then promote prosperity for the large part of its citizens by expanding output and
creating good paying jobs.
I. ECONOMIC DISPARITIES AND WEALTH CONCENTRATION IN AMERICA
The gap between wealthy Americans and the rest of its citizens is now
a daunting reality. Study after study confirms that the current disparity of
wealth in America is frightening17—much more of a factor than at any time
since the Great Depression.18 As this gulf has continued to widen in the last
2011 WL 4836230, at *2–3 (Ga. Super. Ct. Sept. 15, 2011) (showing that shareholders have
shown their disapproval of high compensation for executives despite the company’s poor
performance by casting negative ballots in Dodd-Frank votes).
12
Gordon v. Goodyear, No. 12 C 369, 2012 WL 2885695, at *1, *4 (N.D. Ill. July 13,
2012); see also Laborers’ Local v. Intersil, No. 5:11-CV-04093 EJD, 2012 WL 762319, at *1–2
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2012); Plumbers Local No. 137 Pension Fund v. Davis, No. 03:11-633AC, 2012 WL 104776, at *2 (D. Or. Jan. 11, 2012); Teamsters, 2011 WL 4836230, at *2–3.
13
Gordon, 2012 WL 2885695, at *1, *4; Laborers’ Local, 2012 WL 762319, at *1–2;
Plumbers Local, 2012 WL 104776, at *1; Teamsters, 2011 WL 4836230, at *2–3.
14
NECA-IBEW Pension Fund ex rel. Cincinnati Bell, Inc. v. Cox, 1:11-CV-451, 2011
WL 4383368, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 20, 2011); see also discussion infra Part IX.B.
15
See discussion infra Part X.
16
See John Carney, Solving the Mystery of Corporate Cash Hoarding, CNBC (June 6,
2011, 10:28 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/43293840/Solving_the_Mystery_of_Corporate
_Cash_Hoarding (discussing corporate hording of cash as opposed to paying out dividends).
17
See CSEA Monroe County, N.Y. Local 828, Income Inequality Is America’s 21st
Century Monster, THE VOICE REPORTER (May 6, 2011, 1:28 PM), http://voiceforthemembers
slate.blogspot.com/2011/05/income-inequality-is-americas-21st.html (citing reports that suggest “that income inequality in the United States equals that of Uganda”).
18
Id. (citing statistics published by the Central Intelligence Agency, available at https://
www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/us.html (follow “Select a Country
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several years, it has become increasingly apparent that a large part of it is
a result of exorbitant compensation paid to top corporate officials.19
Things were not always this way, particularly in the immediate postwar era. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the American economy was
growing at a rapid clip and the incomes of all families increased on average
by about 3%.20 Yet a recent study by economists from the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology (M.I.T.) and the Federal Reserve shows that the
pay of top corporate executives during those decades remained steady, increasing by less than 1% per year.21 Business leaders of that time period
did not have to be overpaid to lead their companies to larger profits.
Around 1970, however, things began to change. In the next three decades, earnings of the top 1%, the “working rich,”22 increased by three
times, while the growth of the average family’s real income during those
thirty years was below 15%.23 Corroborating these numbers was a study by
the Congressional Budget Office that showed the after-tax income, adjusted
for inflation, of the top 1% of American families jumped 139% from 1979
to 2001.24 By contrast, “[t]he income of the middle fifth rose by just 17 percent, to $43,700, and the income of the poorest fifth rose only 9 percent.”25
By 2007 even President George W. Bush acknowledged this disparity,
stating: “[t]he fact is that income inequality is real—it’s been rising for more
than 25 years.”26 In that year the top 10% of American earners garnered
or Location” hyperlink, select “UNITED STATES”; then click “Economy : UNITED
STATES” to expand those statistics)).
19
Peter Whoriskey, With Executive Pay, Rich Pull Away from Rest of America, WASH.
POST (June 18, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/with-executive
-pay-rich-pull-away-from-rest-of-america/2011/06/13/AGKG9jaH_story.html.
20
See Jordan Weissman, 60 Years of American Economic History, Told in 1 Graph, THE
ATLANTIC (Aug. 23, 2012, 3:17 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/08
/60-years-of-american-economic-history-told-in-1-graph/261503/ (discussing a graph created
as part of a study undertaken by the Pew Research Center).
21
Carola Frydman & Raven E. Saks, Executive Compensation: A New View from a LongTerm Perspective, 1936–2005, at 7 (Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series, Working Paper No. 35,
2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 972399.
22
The term “working rich” is borrowed from Emmanuel Saez, Striking it Richer: The
Evolution of Top Incomes in the United States, 4 (last updated by author Mar. 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~saez/saez-UStopincomes-2010.pdf.
23
Robert H. Frank, Gauging the Pain of the Middle Class, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2011,
at BU7.
24
Janny Scott & David Leonhardt, Shadowy Lines That Still Divide, N.Y. TIMES,
May 15, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/15/national/class/OVERVIEW-FINAL.html
?pagewanted=all.
25
Id.
26
Michael Abramowitz & Lori Montgomery, Bush Addresses Income Inequality, WASH.
POST, Feb. 1, 2007, at A4 (quoting President George W. Bush) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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almost 50% of the country’s total wages, a level higher than any time
since the start of World War I.27 Statistics on wealth distribution from then
were even more alarming. “As of 2007, the top 1% of households (the upper class) owned 34.6% of all privately held wealth, and the next 19% (the
managerial, professional, and small business stratum) had 50.5%.”28 Just
one-fifth of our citizens therefore controlled over 85% of the country’s
wealth. The bottom two quintiles, by contrast, owned only 0.3%.29 The effects of that prosperity gap were harshest on children whose poverty rate
was twice that of adults.30
Yet social scientists were unsure of what was driving that growing gap
because, until recently, they did not have the data to determine who really
comprised the upper echelon of America’s earners. A new study by leading
economists has established that most of the income gain during those decades was reaped by corporate executives and financiers.31 “The top 0.1 percent of earners make about $1.7 million or more, including capital gains.”32
The current Great Recession has finally put this disturbing situation in
the public spotlight.33 Average Americans have been hurt much more severely by the recent financial meltdown than wealthy Americans, thus
making the maldistribution of society’s resources even more acute. The
net worth of the median family has dropped an “astounding” 36.1% since
2008 whereas the asset values of the top 1% have fallen off by only
11%—widening the prosperity gap even more.34
Even though most Americans may not know the full extent of income
inequality in the country,35 economists, pundits, and bloggers are now
writing and commenting at length on this injustice.36 Comparing America
to other countries with stratified social classes, New York Times columnist Nicholas Kristof wrote, “[m]aybe that’s why the growing inequality in
America pains me so. The wealthiest 1 percent of Americans already have
27

Saez, supra note 17, at 2.
G. William Domhoff, Wealth, Income, and Power, WHO RULES AMERICA?, http://
sociology.ucsc.edu/whorulesamerica/power/wealth.html (last updated Feb. 2013).
29
Id.
30
Gregory Acs & Megan Gallagher, Income Inequality Among America’s Children,
NEW FEDERALISM: NATIONAL SURVEY OF AMERICA’S FAMILIES 1 (Jan. 2000).
31
See Whoriskey, supra note 19, at A16.
32
Id.
33
See Maxwell Strachan, 15 Facts About U.S. Income Inequality That Everyone Should
Know, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 5, 2011, 4:05 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011
/04/05/us-inequality-infographic_n_845042.html#s261411&title=Wage_Inequality (last updated
June 5, 2011, 6:12 AM).
34
Domhoff, supra note 28.
35
See id.
36
Strachan, supra note 33.
28
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a greater net worth than the bottom 90 percent, based on Federal Reserve
data.”37 As Nobel Prize winning economist Joseph E. Stiglitz commented
in May 2011 in an article for Vanity Fair: “Americans have been watching
protests against oppressive regimes that concentrate massive wealth in the
hands of an elite few. Yet in our own democracy, 1 percent of the people
take nearly a quarter of the nation’s income—an inequality even the
wealthy will come to regret.”38
Contrasting the better productivity of American workers with those in
European countries, labor lawyer Thomas Geoghegan notes:
Technically, we seem far ahead, but don’t drool. The U.S. superrich gobble well over two-thirds of the increase. In 2005, the real hourly wage for
production workers in America was approximately 8 percent lower than
it was in 1973, while our national output per hour is 55 percent higher. So
it’s dubious whether most Americans have gained even a penny in purchasing power since 1989.39

In short, much of the gain in productivity by American workers has gone
not to the folks who actually generated the wealth but to the upper echelon
of the managerial class.
Along the same lines, Cornell University economist Robert H. Frank
has created a “toil index” to measure the real costs of consumption such as
paying the rent on a median priced home.40 The hours of work needed by
the average American to meet that expense declined slightly from 1950 to
1970 to just 41.5 per month.41 By 2000, however, that figure had risen to
67.4 hours per month.42 While the rise in Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
showed a general increase in wealth during the last several decades,43 average Americans were going backward in the hours of labor they had to
expend to meet their basic needs.
By fall 2011, the general discontent with this widespread unfairness
gave rise to a spontaneous populist protest. It “began with a few dozen
demonstrators pitching tents on Wall Street in front of the New York
Stock Exchange .... Soon hundreds that included union activists joined
them in a nearby park and the movement spread to a number of cities
37

Nicholas D. Kristof, Our Fantasy Nation?, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2011, at WK9.
Joseph E. Stiglitz, Of the 1%, by the 1%, for the 1%, VANITY FAIR (Apr. 5, 2011),
http://www.vanityfair.com/society/features/2011/05/top-one-percent-201105.
39
THOMAS GEOGHEGAN, WERE YOU BORN ON THE WRONG CONTINENT? 13 (2010).
40
See Frank, supra note 23.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
See id.
38
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around the country.”44 One organizer in Los Angeles said, “the protesters
were united in their desire for a more equal economy.”45 If the Occupy
Wall Street Movement accomplished nothing else, it has “brought that
stark unfairness to the full attention of the American public.”46
II. THE REASONS FOR THE RISE IN WEALTH CONCENTRATION
One academic commentator observing this situation put it aptly: “the
rising tide of economic growth no longer lifts all boats.”47 There seems to be
a consensus among economists and others as to why this is so. As President
George W. Bush explained, “[t]he reason is clear: We have an economy that
increasingly rewards education and skills because of that education.”48
As a report on National Public Radio (NPR) put it, “[n]ew technology
has made many jobs obsolete, while creating dramatic opportunities for
wealth in computers, finance, and media and entertainment.”49 A study on
world trade also concluded that “innovations ... have favored workers with
greater skill and reduced the value of unskilled labor.... Liberal trade with
the newly industrializing countries of the world has certainly played a part
in worsening the job prospects of America’s unskilled workers.”50
Professor Stiglitz thus summed up similar conclusions by a number of
his colleagues in the dismal science:
[L]aborsaving technologies have reduced the demand for many “good”
middle-class, blue-collar jobs. Globalization has created a worldwide
marketplace, pitting expensive unskilled workers in America against
cheap unskilled workers overseas. Social changes have also played a
role—for instance, the decline of unions, which once represented a
third of American workers and now represent about 12 percent.51

44

Christopher Ram, It Is 0.01%, Not 1%—Part 1, CHRISRAM.NET (June 24, 2012,
12:00 AM), http://www.chrisram.net/?p=959.
45
Erick Eckholm & Timothy Williams, Anti-Wall Street Protests Spreading to Cities
Large and Small, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2011, at A18 (internal quotation marks omitted).
46
Ram, supra note 44.
47
Hugh Heclo, Growing Income Inequalities in America?, 111 POL. SCI. Q. 523, 524
(1996).
48
Abramowitz & Montgomery, supra note 26, at A4. For a fine recent piece making
that same point, see Adam Davidson, Making It in America, THE ATLANTIC, Jan. 2012, at 70.
49
Uri Berliner, Haves and Have-Nots: Income Inequality in America, NPR (Feb. 5, 2007,
1:04 PM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=7180618.
50
Gary Burtless, Worsening American Income Inequality: Is World Trade to Blame?, 14
THE BROOKINGS REV., 26, 31 (1996).
51
Stiglitz, supra note 38; see also Davidson, supra note 48, at 70 (“[Because of] the double shock we’re experiencing now—globalization and computer-aided industrial productivity ...
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But Stiglitz was also quick to add another, less excusable cause: “[b]ut
one big part of the reason we have so much inequality is that the top 1 percent want it that way .... Wealth begets power, which begets more wealth.”52
Stiglitz went on to cite low tax rates, particularly on gains from investments,
as a principal reason why America’s rich have become richer while most
of their countrymen have stagnated or slid lower in terms of economic
well-being.53
As the NPR report noted, wealthy people own stocks and upper echelon corporate employees often get a good portion of their compensation in
stock options.54 Since the Bush Tax Changes of 2003, the appreciation of
shares, which has been substantial during the past ten years, has been
taxed at only 15%—much lower than the top bracket on earned income.55
As Professor Stiglitz also noted, corporate wealth evidenced in share
prices has been augmented by relaxed antitrust enforcement and by international competition for businesses, which has weakened environmental laws
and labor rights.56 He also points out how manipulation of our financial system has generated much of the recent, immense wealth.57 The government,
through lax regulation, condoned much of that manipulation and then came
in to rescue banks like Goldman Sachs and Morgan Staley with expensive
bailouts that were deemed necessary to ward off an even greater recession.58
III. VANISHING ECONOMIC MOBILITY
Hand-in-hand with concentration of wealth and the decline in the living
standards of most Americans has gone the demise of one important part of
the American dream: the promise of rising social and material benefits for
income inequality is growing, as the rewards for being skilled grow and the opportunities
for unskilled Americans diminish.”).
52
Stiglitz, supra note 38.
53
See id.; see also Editorial, The 1% and That 15%, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2012, at A22
(comparing the 15% cap on the taxation of investment income with the 25%–35% rate applied to the wage and salary income of American workers).
54
See Berliner, supra note 49.
55
The 1% and That 15%, supra note 53, at A22. The tax reforms enacted in early 2013
have raised the long term capital gains tax now to 20% for high income taxpayers. Laura
Sanders, High Earners Facing First Major Tax Increase in Years, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 2013,
at A1.
56
See Stiglitz, supra note 38.
57
See id. For the author’s description of how that fraudulent conduct brought about
the economic debacle of 2008, see Daniel J. Morrissey, After the Meltdown, 45 TULSA L.
REV. 393, 397–400 (2010).
58
See Paul M. Barrett, Bubble Beater, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2011, at BR13 (reviewing
WILLIAM D. COHAN, MONEY AND POWER (2011)).
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the next generation. As two New York Times reporters described this traditional belief: “There are poor and rich in the United States, of course, the
argument goes; but as long as one can become the other, as long as there is
something close to equality of opportunity, the differences between them
do not add up to class barriers.”59 The renowned social historian Francis
Fukuyama has recently made much the same point:
Inequality per se has never been a big problem in American political
culture, which emphasizes equality of opportunity rather than of outcomes. But the system remains legitimate only as long as people believe
that by working hard and doing their best, they and their children have
a fair shot at getting ahead, and that the wealthy got there playing by
the rules.60

Professor Fukuyama continues, however, with this chilling assessment:
The fact is, however, that rates of intergenerational social mobility are
far lower in the United States than many Americans believe them to be,
and lower than in many other developed countries that traditionally have
been regarded as rigid and stratified. Over time elites are able to protect
their positions by gaming the political system, moving their money offshore to avoid taxation, and transmitting these advantages to their children through favored access to elite institutions.61

Studies of inheritance patterns at elite colleges bear out this disappointing conclusion about the lack of social and economic mobility. “According
to a study published by the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, only 1.6%
of Americans receive $100,000 or more in inheritance.”62 “Another 1.1%
receive $50,000 to $100,000,” but an astonishing 91.1% have older relatives
who cannot leave them anything.63 A 2010 study by Georgetown University
of the country’s most selective colleges found that “only 15 percent of students came from the bottom half of the income distribution,” whereas over
two-thirds came from the wealthiest quarter of households.64
59

Scott & Leonhardt, supra note 24.
FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE ORIGINS OF POLITICAL ORDER 8–9 (2011).
61
Id. at 9 (citation omitted); see also Timothy Noah, The Mobility Myth, NEW REPUBLIC,
Mar. 1, 2012, at 14 (elaborating on the thesis that “[m]ost of Western Europe today is both
more equal in incomes and more economically mobile than the United States”).
62
Domhoff, supra note 28.
63
Id.
64
David Leonhardt, Top Colleges, Largely for the Elite, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2011,
at B1, B9. As one social critic recently put it, “[t]he haves in our society are increasingly cocooned in a system that makes it easy for their children to continue to be haves.” Charles
Murray, Narrowing the New Class Divide, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2012, at A31.
60
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IV. THE CONSEQUENCES OF INEQUALITY
There is some debate about the ramifications of this vanishing economic mobility. One author comments that the possibility of disparate
economic results can motivate people to work harder.65 If everyone was
compensated the same amount regardless of what they did for society,
many folks might not feel compelled to be productive.66 Another supposed
benefit of lower wages, at least in the global economy, is that they allow
Americans to purchase goods cheaper, which can contribute to a higher
standard of living.67
From the perspective of psychology and cognitive science, Professor
Tyler Cowen adds insight about the causes of inequality. It results less, he
suggests, from the low-paid workers at the bottom of the economic ladder
than from the small population of brilliant inventors and business people
situated at the top.68 “The root cause of income inequality, viewed in the
most general terms,” he says, “is extreme human ingenuity, albeit of a
perverse kind. That is why it is so hard to control.”69
Yet one does not have to be a radical egalitarian to see the adverse
consequences that such a state of affairs will ultimately have for American
society. Professor Fukuyama notes, “the rising levels of populist anger on
both the Right and Left ... contribute to polarization and reflect a social
reality at odds with the country’s own legitimating principles.”70 The title of

65

See Catherine Rampell, Thy Neighbor’s Wealth, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2011, at BR17
(reviewing BRANKO MILANOVIC, THE HAVES AND THE HAVE-NOTS (2010)).
66
Id. (discussing Milanovic’s suggestion that “[t]he possibility of unequal economic
outcomes motivates people to work harder ... although at some point it can lead to the preservation of acquired positions, which causes economies to stagnate”).
67
See Strachan, supra note 33.
68
See Tyler Cowen, The Inequality That Matters, THE AM. INTEREST, Jan.–Feb. 2011, at 37.
69
See id.; see also ROBERT A.G. MONKS & NELL MINOW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
10 (5th ed. 2011). To sum up the root cause of income inequality, it states:
Before the creation of the corporate structure, there were few opportunities for individuals to make dramatic changes in status and wealth.
However, corporate history is filled with people like Henry Ford, Walt
Disney, Bill Gates, Steve Jobs, and Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg, who
changed the world and made themselves and their investors rich. The
American system has provided opportunity for immigrants from Andrew
Carnegie to Google’s Sergey Brin to create almost unimaginable wealth.
Id.
70
FUKUYAMA, supra note 60, at 8. For trenchant comments about how hard times have
brought about a resurgence of right-wing politics, see generally THOMAS FRANK, PITY THE
BILLIONAIRE (2012).
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Professor Stiglitz’s recent piece, Of the 1%, by the 1%, for the 1%,71 is a
play on that point. Economic inequality could even affect the physical health
of American society, as columnist David Brooks cites Richard Wilkinson
and Kate Pickett for the finding that, “[i]nequality and a feeling of exclusion causes social pain, which leads to more obesity, worse health outcomes,
fewer social connections, more depression and anxiety.”72
Others see a similar threat to the general welfare. Conservative former
Federal Reserve Chairman, Alan Greenspan, has recently noted that our unequal economy is “very distorted.”73 Another commentator has pointed out
the disturbing lack of empathy among its winners for those who are less
fortunate.74 The plutocrats, she says, who have emerged from this winnertake-all system, are now increasingly a global class to themselves, without
any particular allegiance to citizens from their homeland.75 Many seem to
suggest that the trials of the American working class are their own fault.76
Caveats about the corrosive effects of great wealth are as old as the
Scriptures. There is a corresponding lesson that we are all in this together.
As Dr. Stiglitz writes, “looking out for the other guy isn’t just good for the
soul—it’s good for business.”77 Consumer demand and purchasing power
drive our economy and make it possible for businesses to flourish.78
Along those lines, fears abound about the rise of a new, very large underclass comprised of white men.79 This group has grown in the post-industrial
economy as wages for working people have been going down since 1983
and longer than that for blue-collar males.80 This startling decline was compounded by “the Great Recession, during which three-quarters of the 8
million jobs lost were lost by men.”81 As David Brooks summed up this
alarming state of affairs, “[t]he American working class—those without a
college degree—is being decimated, economically and socially.”82
71

Stiglitz, supra note 38, at 6.
DAVID BROOKS, THE SOCIAL ANIMAL 330 (2011).
73
Chrystia Freeland, The Rise of the New Global Elite, THE ATLANTIC, Jan.–Feb. 2011,
at 44, 46.
74
See id. at 46.
75
See id.
76
Id. at 52.
77
Stiglitz, supra note 38.
78
See Robert B. Reich, Op-Ed., The Limping Middle Class, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2011,
at SR6.
79
For a study that attributes this more to the breakdown of civic values than to economic concerns, see CHARLES MURRAY, COMING APART 12–13 (2012).
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V. SOARING EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
Contrast the stark reality of difficult economic times for many Americans
with the current good fortune enjoyed by business leaders. In 1965, the typical American CEO made 24 times the average worker.83 By 2007, that differential had increased by more than tenfold to 275,84 and it has continued to
grow. According to a study by the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), the compensation of CEOs
at America’s 300 largest companies in 2010 was 343 times the average
worker’s pay.85 While the average American worker earned $46,742 in
2010, a 2% rise from 2009, and unemployment remained shockingly high,
the compensation of Standard & Poor (S&P) 500 CEOs was $12 million,
up 18% over the same time period.86 Commenting on this huge pay differential, Eleanor Bloxham from the Value Alliance stated, “[i]t’s insane ....
Corporate boards have bought into the idea that they have to pay up for
performance. There’ll be more of the same until institutional investors decide CEOs aren’t worth what they’re being paid.”87
As has been said, executive pay has not always surged so far beyond
the wages of working people.88 Even during the fast-growing post-war
decades, it remained level.89 Since the 1980s, it has zoomed upward,90
fueled in large part by the increased use of incentive pay comprised of
stock options and bonus awards allegedly tied to firm performance.91
Those mechanisms for compensation became dominant in 1992 when
Congress, alarmed that the average CEO’s pay had risen to what today
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NEW YORKER, Oct. 12, 2009, at 58.
84
Id.
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(Apr. 20, 2011, 7:46 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/04/19/news/economy/ceo_pay/index.htm.
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Gary Strauss, Stock Options Help CEOs Cash In, USA TODAY, July 8, 2011, at 1A;
see also Joann S. Lublin, CEO Pay in 2010 Jumped 11%, WALL ST. J., May 9, 2011, at B1.
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pay is not limited to the United States. Recently the conservative prime minister of Great
Britain, David Cameron, said that large pay packages awarded to executives in Great Britain
during a time of general austerity, “made people’s blood boil.” Julia Werdigier, In Britain,
Rising Outcry over Executive Pay That Makes ‘People’s Blood Boil,’ N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23,
2012, at B5.
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See Owen, supra note 83, at 58 and accompanying text.
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Frydman & Saks, supra note 21, at 2.
90
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seems a very modest $750,000,92 capped the deductibility of executive compensation at $1 million.93 Then, according to Nell Minow, the leader of a research firm dedicated to improving corporate governance,94 “[t]he first thing
that happened was that everybody got a raise to a million dollars. The second
was that companies started issuing bazillions [sic] of options.”95
Minow continued her critique: “[o]ptions are intended to reward executives for increasing their company’s market capitalization—a benefit for all
shareholders. But executives have turned out to be ingenious at eliminating
any personal risk, turning options into corporate play money, and helping
to inaugurate the ongoing proliferation of American billionaires.”96 Compensation by options has been easy to game, most notoriously by the widespread practice of executives backdating the grant dates of their options.97
Even leaving aside that patently illegal practice, there are plenty of other
ways that corporate officials can manipulate those awards in order to engineer exorbitant compensation for themselves. For instance, they need only
have their firms issue them stock and options when the prices of those financial instruments are historically depressed. Just recently, during the market’s
low point in late 2008 and late 2009, more than 90% of the CEOs at S & P’s
top 500 companies received large amounts of those securities.98 When stock
prices rebounded in spring 2011, those awards netted them $3 billion.99 In
addition, that surge gave American executives more billions in gains on the
stocks and options they already held. Commenting on that remuneration,
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MINOW, supra note 69.
95
Owen, supra note 83, at 59.
96
Id. Minow has elaborated on her critique and brought it up-to-date with scandalous examples of exorbitant, unearned compensation by CEOs like Countrywide’s Angelo Mozilo whose
company suffered massive losses during the financial meltdown. See Nell Minow, Executive
Decisions: Why CEO pay spun out of control, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 1, 2012, at 9.
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86 OR. L. REV. 973, 975 (2007).
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J., Apr. 27, 2011, at A1.
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Paul Hodgson, a compensation expert, said “[s]ome of the gains are humongous” and predicted that they would continue in 2011.100
Companies that issue huge amounts of stock and options to their executives dilute the wealth left over for their shareholders. As one astute
investment adviser put it, “[w]hen compensation is excessive, that should
be a red flag .... Does the company exist for the benefit of shareholders or
insiders? ... Stock-based compensation plans are often nothing more than
legalized front-running, insider trading and stock watering all wrapped
into one package.”101
By that standard, shareholders and the investing public are particularly
ill-served today by the stewards of their wealth. While many businesses
that were hard hit by the recession have been doing better lately, top corporate officers seem to be raking off a larger and larger share of that increased
wealth, getting hefty raises and multimillion-dollar paychecks. Philippe P.
Dauman of Viacom, Ray R. Irani of Occidental Petroleum, and Lawrence
J. Ellison of Oracle were near the top of that list with compensation last
year of $84.5 million, $76.1 million, and $70.1 million respectively.102 John
Hammergren the CEO of McKesson Corp., a healthcare services firm, was
at its head taking down $150.7 million.103
In addition, nearly obscene severance arrangements compound these
outrageous annual payments. The aforementioned Mr. Hammergren will get
$469 million from his company if there is a change in managerial control.104
In September 2011, Leo Apotheker, Hewlett-Packard’s CEO, resigned after
serving just eleven months.105 Even though the company’s stock dropped
50% during his tenure,106 he took with him a golden parachute of $13.2
million in severance pay on top of a signing package worth $10 million.107
That however was chump change compared to relatively recent golden
parachutes in excess of $200 million each for Hank McKinnell of Pfizer
100
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Gretchen Morgenson, Enriching a Few at the Expense of Many, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10,
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2011, at BU1, BU6.
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2011, 2:56 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505123_162-57343611/highest-paid.
104
Sherter, supra note 103.
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106
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Dec. 15, 2011, at B6.
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and Robert Nardelli of Home Depot,108 and a $46 million bonus in advance of $3.4 million in severance awarded to Adam Metz last year after
just two years at General Growth Properties, a land trust.109 This past year,
General Growth Properties collapsed in one of our country’s largest commercial real estate bankruptcies.110
One also cannot overlook the lush benefits these emperors of industry
receive. The most notorious perquisite was the estimated $700,000 worth
of unreported corporate jet usage by Eugene Isenberg, the CEO of Nabors
Industries during 2009–2010.111 The Wall Street Journal discovered that
he often flew on the company plane to his homes in Palm Beach, Florida
and Martha’s Vineyard, Massachusetts.112
VI. LEGAL RESPONSES BEFORE SAY-ON-PAY
A. Case Law
Opponents of excessive executive compensation scored an early victory
at the U.S. Supreme Court in the celebrated case of Rogers v. Hill.113 In 1930,
during the Great Depression, the president of the American Tobacco Company
was paid salary and bonuses over $1 million based on a provision in the
company’s by-laws that entitled him to 2.5% of the firm’s profits.114 While
the compensation arising from that formula had not been excessive when
it was adopted two decades earlier, in subsequent years there had been what
the court called an “enormous increase in the company’s profits” that resulted in what for that time was exorbitant remuneration.115 Because the top
executive’s pay had gotten so large, the Court held that the complaining
shareholder had successfully stated a claim of waste.116 In justification for
that holding it quoted these remarks from Judge Thomas Swan, a distinguished jurist of that era, who dissented in the lower court’s opinion: “If a
bonus payment has no relation to the value of services for which it is given,
it is in reality a gift in part and the majority stockholders have no power to
give away corporate property against the protest of the minority.”117
108
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A later case arising out the same situation however set quite a different
tone for those actions and proved, until recently, to be the more influential.118
There, the Court called those same payments
munificent. To the person of moderate income they would be princely—
perhaps something unattainable; to the wage earner eking out an existence
they would be fabulous and the unemployed might regard them as fantastic, if not criminal. To others they would seem immoral, inexcusably unequal and an indictment of our economic system.119

Yet noting that a majority of the shareholders had recently ratified the
payments,120 the Court cited its “reluctance ... to interfere with the internal
management of a corporation.”121 Stating that “[c]ourts are ill-equipped to
solve or even to grapple with these entangled economic problems,”122 it
dismissed the action.
In the post–World War II era the influential Delaware Supreme Court
followed this approach showing little interest in overturning a compensation plan that had been approved by disinterested and independent directors as beneficial to the company and ratified by its shareholders.123 In the
2006 Disney case,124 the Delaware High Court refused to set aside a lucrative severance deal for the dismissed president of the company, Michael
Ovitz. Disney however involved payments made under an employment
contract entered into before Mr. Ovitz went to work for the company, not
big jumps in pay given to an already-employed corporate official.125
By contrast, in a more recent case from Delaware,126 Chancellor Chandler
refused to dismiss a waste claim against Citigroup’s CEO, Charles Prince,
who was responsible for billions of dollars of losses by that company during the financial meltdown. After stating the general authority of boards to
set executive compensation, the Chancellor made this telling comment:
It is also well settled in our law, however, that the discretion of directors in setting executive compensation is not unlimited. Indeed, the
Delaware Supreme Court was clear when it stated that “there is an outer
118
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limit” to the board’s discretion to set executive compensation, “at which
point a decision of the directors on executive compensation is so disproportionately large as to be unconscionable and constitute waste.”127

The Chancellor went on to examine the allegations that Mr. Prince had been
paid $68 million upon departing from his top position at Citigroup in 2007
after the housing market had crashed.128 The Chancellor found that the shareholders raised reasonable doubt as to whether Citi’s board was well-informed,
careful, and rational in approving that compensation plan.129
B. SEC Disclosure Requirements
On the federal front, since its beginnings in the 1930s the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) has used its regulatory power under the securities laws130 to compel disclosure of executive and director compensation
by public companies. Acting on its mandate to provide helpful information to investors, the Commission has amended its requirements for public
company reporting periodically in response to changing forms of corporate remuneration.131
In 2006, shortly after options-backdating scandals became public, the
SEC issued a revision of its compensation rules, changing previous requirements for disclosing backdating.132 To promote annual and intercompany
comparisons, in 1992 the Commission mandated a tabular format for disclosing backdating.133 The 2006 standards refined that approach and required
that company officials explain their remuneration policies in a narrative
analysis called Compensation Discussion and Analysis (CD&A).134 Other
new SEC provisions called for tabular presentations of senior executive
compensation over a three-year period, which must include equity-based
awards and amounts realized from those holdings as well as potential postemployment payments.135 When publishing those regulations, the Director
of the SEC’s Division of Corporate Finance gave this reason for those rules:
127
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Investors will now be provided with one number for total annual compensation for each named executive officer. The clarity and comparability
of this one number will be complemented by the principles-based narrative disclosures in our new Compensation Discussion and Analysis section
and by the requirement that these disclosures be made in plain English.136

Some commentators thought that more extensive disclosure requirements
for compensation would shame corporate officials into showing some restraint, but that hardly seems to have been the result.137 Rather, greedy executives now appear to be using that disclosure as a benchmark to ratchet
up their own pay by arguing that their remuneration should be at that level
or better.138 As one commentator put it:
Chief executives tend to view themselves as residents of Lake Wobegon,
where all children are above average .... The compensation details of their
counterparts provides them with the leverage to request a higher amount
from boards. The result: each year executive pay rises ever higher and the
industry average is reset.139

C. Comments by Scholars and Public Officials
Two prolific and renowned scholars of business law, Professor Lucian
Bebchuk and Judge Richard Posner, have also weighed in with very critical comments on the current state of corporate remuneration, as has the respected Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) Special Master, Kenneth
Feinberg.140 In a 2004 book with Professor Jesse Fried, Pay Without Performance, Bebchuk attacked what he called the “official view” that directors
136
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to Disclosure Requirements Concerning Executive Compensation and Related Matters
(July 26, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006/2006-123.htm.
137
See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 5, 8–9 (2004) (describing public
outrage as a factor directors and executives consider when approving executive compensation packages); Sandeep Gopalan, Shame Sanctions and Excessive CEO Pay, 32 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 757, 758–60, 762, 768 (2007).
138
See Richard A. Posner, Essay, Are American CEOs Overpaid, and, if So, What if
Anything Should Be Done About It?, 58 DUKE L.J. 1013, 1024, 1035 (2009).
139
Steven M. Davidoff, Efforts to Rein in Executive Pay Meet with Little Success, N.Y.
TIMES, July 13, 2011, at B7.
140
See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Paying for Long-Term Performance, 158
U. PA. L. REV. 1915, 1917 (2010) (arguing that the 2008–2009 financial crisis prompted recognition of the problems with current executive pay schemes); Posner, supra note 138, at 1013–
14; Louise Story, Pay Czar Doubts Cuts Will Make Bankers Leave, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2009,
at B8 (discussing Kenneth Feinberg’s work in this area and quoting him as saying he had
“concluded that anybody making $100 million a year is engaged in excessive risk”).

20

WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4:001

fix executive pay in arm’s-length negotiations with executives in order to
provide incentive for those officials to increase shareholder wealth.141 In
reality, Bebchuk and others argue, corporate leaders set their own pay
through captured boards.142
While Bebchuk declined to pass judgment on the high levels of executive pay, he levied heavy fire on their failure to provide any real incentives
to corporate management. They are, he said, “compensation practices that
obscure the amount and performance insensitivity of pay ....”143 His point
was thus a modern restatement of economist John Kenneth Galbraith’s
famous dictum, “[t]he salary of the chief executive of the large corporation
is not a market award for achievement. It is frequently in the nature of a
warm personal gesture by the individual to himself.”144
In 2008, the country suffered a devastating financial meltdown brought
on by the collapse of debt obligations collateralized by inflated real estate
values.145 The federal government stepped in with an enormously expensive
bailout of banks that had created and dealt in those speculative securities.146
In October 2009, Kenneth Feinberg, the special master appointed to oversee executive compensation for banks receiving these so-called TARP funds,
ruled that the twenty-five most highly paid executives at those institutions
would have their pay capped at $500,000.147 When asked if he anticipated
that his ruling would more broadly change the practices of executive pay,
141
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Feinberg replied, “I hope so.”148 That advice, however, has not been heeded
by corporate America.
In the wake of the financial crisis, Bebchuk and co-authors presented
evidence that executive pay arrangements such as stock options encouraged excessive risk taking that ultimately had deleterious effects on the
economy.149 Executives at two large financial firms that collapsed in the
meltdown, Bear Sterns and Lehman Brothers, cashed out and kept large,
so-called performance-based compensation that they garnered in the decade before the crash.150 Bebchuk and Fried followed up with another article
discussing ways that executives’ compensation can be genuinely tied to the
long-term performance of their firms by generally requiring that management hold equity grants for the long term.151 Another commentator suggested that the same result is currently achieved by firms that substitute
grants of restricted stock for options.152
Judge Posner, the father of Law and Economics, made similar critical
comments recently, stating, “[t]he problem of executive compensation is not
only real; it is more serious than I believed it to be ....”153 First he saw it as
a problem of agency costs, that is, excessive amounts paid by owners of a
business to those who manage it.154 With “the uncertainty that surrounds
success in business,”155 it is very difficult, Posner said, to evaluate the performance of a CEO and therefore to say that she has really earned her pay.
Even if there was a reliable method of sizing up the work of a top corporate official, Posner said, boards generally would be unable to apply it
148
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2009, at B1.
149
See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Holger Spamann, The Wages of Failure:
Executive Compensation at Bear Stearns and Lehman 2000–2008, 27 YALE J. ON REG.
257, 274–76 (2010). Another commentator made the same comments even more bluntly:
An officer with stock options has an incentive to move corporate assets
from stable, low-volatility investments into high-risk investments because
that enhances the value of his options. An option holder does not participate in losses, although the underlying assets of the corporation collapse.
A corporation that has given its managers substantial options has given
them incentives to invest in highly volatile, even suicidal, investments, which
should scare the pants off shareholders.
Calvin H. Johnson, Corporate Meltdowns Caused by Compensatory Stock Options, TAX
NOTES, May 16, 2011, at 738.
150
See Bebchuk, Cohen & Spamann, supra note 149, at 276.
151
See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 140, at 1919–20.
152
See David I. Walker, Evolving Executive Equity Compensation and the Limits of
Optimal Contracting, 64 VAND. L. REV. 611, 667–68 (2011).
153
Posner, supra note 138, at 1014.
154
See id. at 1015–16.
155
Id. at 1018.

22

WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4:001

to the CEO at their firms.156 Directors generally come from the ranks of
executives at other companies and thus have a vested interest in keeping
the compensation of similarly situated officials high.157 In addition, since
CEOs influence the choice and pay of directors, “there is evidence of mutual back scratching—the directors authorizing generous compensation for
the CEO and the CEO supporting generous fees for the directors.”158
Posner also found that so-called incentive compensation for executives,
such as stock options, are not well aligned with the CEO’s performance
because “[m]any things move a company’s stock besides the decisions of its
CEO.”159 He also cited the common practice of repricing executive options
when a company’s stock has fallen and compared it to backdating, which,
he said, is only a clandestine approach to achieve the same result.160 Both
allow the recipients to reap large gains from stock appreciation.
Judge Posner concluded that the social costs of excessive compensation are very disturbing, stating that “[t]he redistributive effects are obvious and are troubling from an ethical standpoint because, by definition,
overcompensation is a kind of theft from shareholders.”161 Another current
commentator echoed those sentiments and expressed similar doubts about
the validity of top corporate pay, in whatever form it takes:
I believe that interactions between executives and companies can be
characterized as struggles between hyper-interested and very well organized minorities, i.e., the executives, and relatively disinterested and extremely disorganized majorities, i.e., the shareholders as represented by
boards of directors. Executives will prevail in such struggles every time.
Inevitably, the end products of such struggles will be contracts that have
more to do with optimal looting than with optimal incentive creation.162

VII. THE COMING OF SAY-ON-PAY
The famed study of Professors Berle and Means published in 1932 established that the control of public companies is effectively separated from its
far-flung shareholder-owners and is lodged in a self-perpetuating managerial
156

See id.
See id. at 1023.
158
Id. at 1024.
159
Id. at 1026.
160
See id. at 1027–28.
161
Id. at 1042.
162
Herwig Schlunk, Response, Some Thoughts on the Evolution of Executive Equity
Compensation, 64 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 73, 73–74 (Mar. 31, 2011, 11:55 AM), http://www
.vanderbiltlawreview.org/content/articles/2011/03/Schlunk-Some-Thoughts-on-the-Evolution
-of-Executive-Equity-Compensation-64-Vand.-L.-Rev.-En.-Banc.-73-2011.pdf.
157

2013] EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, INCOME INEQUALITY

23

class.163 As one leading corporate critic put it, “[i]t’s one of the great anomalies of our ownership society: shareholders own companies, but executives can easily slap them down. The hired help, in other words, holds the
cards.”164 Starting from at least the Watergate scandals of the 1970s, there
have been widespread movements to reform corporate governance practices
so that officers and directors are held more accountable to their shareholders
and the public.165 Yet those efforts seem to have produced little success.
As public awareness of this exorbitant compensation grew, however,
investor groups and other activists began demanding shareholder input on
those decisions.166 Under pressure, a few firms voluntarily afforded stockholders a Say-on-Pay vote. Congressional action to mandate Say-on-Pay
measures at all public companies began with a bill introduced by Congressman Barney Frank in 2007.167 In 2009, that Congressional action
morphed into a law requiring all firms receiving TARP assistance to hold
such a vote.168 Finally, after a lengthy legislative process to address the
causes of the financial meltdown, Congress included a provision in the
omnibus Dodd-Frank Act giving shareholders in all public companies a
nonbinding vote on the compensation received by their executives.169 With
President Obama’s signature, it became law in July 2010.170
The Dodd-Frank Say-on-Pay measure added a new subsection to the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 entitled “Shareholder Approval of Executive Compensation.”171 It requires that public companies hold shareholder advisory votes on the executive compensation described in their proxy
statements at least once every three years.172 This resolution in the proxy
statements does not need any special language. The Dodd-Frank Say-onPay measure also mandates that at the first annual meeting after its enactment, the shareholders elect how frequently they will take these votes—at
163
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a one-, two-, or three-year interval.173 This is the so-called “Say-When-onPay” vote. A separate advisory vote is also required on severance arrangements under a golden parachute provision.174
The law also includes a “Rule of Construction.”175 It may not be interpreted:
(1) as overruling a decision by such issuer or board of directors;
(2) to create or imply any change to the fiduciary duties of such issuer
or board of directors;
(3) to create or imply any additional fiduciary duties for such issuer or
board of directors; or
(4) to restrict or limit the ability of shareholders to make proposals for
inclusion in proxy materials related to executive compensation.176

The SEC followed up with its own regulations implementing Say-on-Pay.177
It requires that the results of those votes be reported promptly to the public
on Form 8-K.178 It also mandates that each firm’s narrative disclosure in
future proxy statements must explain when those results were taken into
account in future compensation decisions.179
A similar Say-on-Pay provision has existed since 2004 in the United
Kingdom where it has constrained executive pay at poorly performing
firms.180 This led one commentator to propose that such a vote would be
more effective if taken ex ante, that is, as a review of the pay package of a
prospective CEO rather than ex post, as a referendum on whether performance warranted the already awarded pay package.181
Shareholders under the regime established by Dodd-Frank, he argued,
also might be reluctant to cast a negative vote on exorbitant compensation at
a well-performing firm for fear of offending its management.182 The commentator also surmised that in its present form as an after-the-fact advisory
vote, the principal harm to directors of a negative Say-on-Pay vote would
173
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be reputational, although it could also signal an implicit threat to remove
directors at their re-elections or through a proxy contest.183
VIII. SAY-ON-PAY: THE FIRST YEAR AND BEYOND
When Say-on-Pay went into effect in early 2011, one commentator assessed some of its early votes and predicted that the measure would have
“a transformative impact on the relationship between chief executives and
institutional investors.”184 After a full year’s operation, however, the results are more mixed. By June, at the end of the spring proxy season in
which a large majority of public companies held their annual meetings,
shareholders casting Say-on-Pay votes had overwhelmingly approved the
executive compensation at their companies.185 Institutional Shareholder
Services (ISS), a leading shareholder advocate, recommended a negative
vote at 293 companies.186 Yet a majority of voting shareholders from over
2,500 firms signaled their approval of the pay packages at all but 39.187
This amounted to a “Yes” vote at 98.5% of the companies.188
An editorial therefore called Say-on-Pay “a disappointment” and cited
this comment on the process from Robert A.G. Monks, a corporate governance expert: “[y]ou only have the appearance of reform, and it’s a cruel
hoax.”189 In the same vein, another commentator said, “[t]he latest ‘say on
pay’ endeavor has turned into a costly exercise that validates almost every
companies’ [sic] pay practices.”190
Yet the same expert noted that the reforms were not futile.191 Some
companies foresaw shareholder criticism and changed their pay arrangements ahead of the votes.192 Almost 80% of companies on the Russell
3000 index endorsed annual votes rather than every 2 or 3 years, and there
was also evidence that instead of “the country club back-slapping of earlier
years,” pay scales were being more closely tied to company performance.193
183
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Other observers cited similar promising outcomes. Some companies,
like General Electric, that had originally received negative recommendations
from ISS changed their compensation policies and secured its approval,194
and many companies made changes in their compensation programs in anticipation of the first round of Say-on-Pay votes.195 Additionally Lynn Turner,
former chief accountant for the SEC, explained the positive ballots by noting that “mutual funds, which own 70 percent of U.S. equities and are many
companies’ biggest shareholders,” often have contracts with corporations to
manage their employees’ 401(k) plans.196 As such, “[t]he big mutual fund
companies ‘won’t vote against management on compensation unless they’re
really bad.’”197
Another observer counseled firms not to take the wrong message from
this first year of voting because “institutional investors said they reserved
their ‘No’ votes for particularly egregious compensation practices. They felt
that too many ‘No’ votes would ‘dilute the effectiveness of voting against
the pay plans ....’”198
Along the same lines, recent polling data demonstrates that “an overwhelming majority [of institutional investors] expect[] the number of companies with majority ‘No’ votes to increase in 2012.”199 With that in mind, a
large majority of companies are reviewing the results of the 2011 vote to see
if they should make changes in their compensation plans in anticipation of
the 2012 ballot.200 PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP determined that shareholders had particular concerns that led them to vote “No” in Say-on-Pay
votes in 2011, including “‘cherry-picking’ of performance metrics from
year to year[,] ‘[m]ake-up’ cash and equity awards when the plans do not
pay out because executives didn’t reach performance targets[,] [e]xecutive
perquisites[, and] [c]ompensation levels that are facially ‘too high.’”201
Negative votes may also increase in 2012 because of new SEC disclosure rules expected to go into effect during the year.202 Chief among them
194
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will be a requirement that companies state the ratio of their CEO’s pay to
that of their median employee.203 This will quite bluntly mandate that firms
“put in black-and-white that the CEO makes umpteen [sic] times more than
the median total compensation for all employees in the organization.”204
Republicans in Congress, however, and their allies who lobby for Wall
Street, have made a strong push to repeal or cut back the reforms of DoddFrank. One former senator called their support “the most uneven battle since
Little Big Horn.”205 Business groups, emboldened by a judicial decision in
July 2011 striking down the SEC’s proxy access rule, might also bring to
court challenges to all or parts of Dodd-Frank.206 By contrast, a senior
Obama official speaking of the upcoming presidential election said that
the President would make the legislation “one of the central elements of
the campaign.”207 “One of the main elements of the contrast will be that
the president passed Wall Street reform and our opponent and the other
party want to repeal it.”208
IX. SAY-ON-PAY VOTES AS EVIDENCE OF BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES
A. Preliminary Considerations
Under the internal affairs doctrine, officers and directors owe duties to
their shareholders. These duties are determined by the states where the
firm is incorporated.209 In addition, all states place the power to manage a
203
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corporation under the supervision of its board of directors.210 Congress,
therefore, had to make Say-on-Pay votes advisory or else it would be impinging on the prerogative of state jurisdiction.
One conservative legal scholar, Steven Bainbridge, thus went on the
record with this dismissive view of potential lawsuits based on such negative votes:
In state law, executive compensation decisions by the board of directors
is [sic] subject to the business judgment rule, making shareholder pay lawsuits extremely hard to win .... The act and its legislative history further
make clear that the votes shall not be deemed either to effect or affect the
fiduciary duties of directors. ... It’ll be interesting to see what legal theories
these plaintiffs [sic] lawyers come up with .... Surely they won’t have the
brass balls to claim that say on pay is binding, will they?211

Despite Professor Bainbridge’s comments doubting the resolve of shareholder lawyers, by September 2011 at least seven derivative suits were filed
against senior executives, directors, and their compensation consultants over
negative Say-on-Pay votes.212 They all alleged that courts should excuse as
futile the preliminary requirement for pre-suit demand on the board, because
those directors had already approved the questionable compensation.213
The suits did not challenge the directors’ and officers’ duty of care which
would be protected by the business judgment rule and exculpatory provisions
such as Section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware Corporate Code.214 Instead, they
210
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alleged that the “No” votes reflected the “independent business judgment”
of shareholders that the pay was not in the interest of their firms and they
attacked the compensation decisions as breaches of the duties of loyalty
and good faith owed by corporate officials to their shareholders.215
Astute commentators pointed out that recent Delaware decisions had
laid the groundwork for such claims.216 In Gantler v. Stephens, Delaware’s
High Court ruled that corporate officers have the same fiduciary duties as
directors.217 A few years earlier, the Chancellor had found that a CEO violated his duty of loyalty when negotiating a compensation agreement with
his company.218 Unlike Mr. Ovitz in Disney who was bargaining for his
first employment contract,219 the CEO here was already the top official of
the firm and thus likely to receive a sweetheart deal.220
B. Cincinnati Bell
Commentators therefore should not have been so quick to call these
Say-on-Pay suits frivolous.221 On the contrary, it should have been apparent that they had the potential to really “shake up a boardroom.”222 In September 2011, a U.S. District Court refused to dismiss a Say-on-Pay suit by
automatically acceding to the business judgment of directors.223 Instead,
confirming the potential of Say-on-Pay suits, the court ruled that whether
such deference was warranted would be a question for trial. The court also
excused the requirement that shareholders make a pre-suit demand.224
The case involved $4 million in bonuses given to the CEO of Cincinnati
Bell, Inc., “on top of $4.5 million in salary and other compensation.”225
Cincinnati Bell’s board took that action despite “a $61.3 million decline in
incorporation it holds the officials of those firms harmless for any damage claims that they
have breached their fiduciary duties of care. See also MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30 (2011).
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net income, a drop in earnings per share from $0.37 to $0.09, a reduction in
share price from $3.45 to $2.80, and a negative 18.8% annual shareholder
return.”226 In light of that poor performance it should have been no surprise that the company’s shareholders registered a 66% “No” vote against
the CEO’s increased pay package.227
The shareholder plaintiff brought the suit alleging that the directors
had breached their duty of loyalty in awarding the bonuses.228 To establish
liability, a shareholder has to meet a high standard of culpability under Ohio
law. It requires a showing of “a deliberate intent to cause injury to the corporation or reckless disregard for the best interests of the corporation.”229
Even though informed decisions on compensation by disinterested directors
are presumed to be the product of a valid business judgment, the Cincinnati
Bell court found that the plaintiff had adequately pled facts showing that
protection might not be available in that case.230
The court justified its ruling by citing the company’s own pay-forperformance policy.231 It held that there was therefore a plausible claim the
“multi-million dollar bonuses approved ... in a the time of the company’s
declining financial performance ... were not in the best interests of Cincinnati
Bell’s shareholders and therefore constituted an abuse of discretion and/or
bad faith.”232
In its lengthy first footnote, the court gave an indication of how the negative Say-on-Pay suit impacted its decision.233 There the court observed
that some commentators have identified excessive executive compensation
as the “[n]o. 1 problem in corporate governance.”234 It then went on to cite
various statistics describing how CEO pay has far outstripped average
wages and how the misdistribution of earnings and wealth in our country
has grown to alarming proportions.235
It then noted that Congress had passed Dodd-Frank with its Say-onPay provision “against this backdrop.”236 Next it noted that,
226
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[a]lthough Dodd-Frank states that those [votes] are not binding and do
not alter the fiduciary duties of directors, some commentators opine that
“[a] negative say-on-pay vote gives the court evidence that there’s been a
breach of duty. It doesn’t mean there’s been a breach of duty, but it can
support a finding of breach.”237

Finally, turning the fear of frivolous litigation on its head, the court cited a
report that as of June 2011 shareholders had disapproved of executive pay
in only 1.6% of public companies that took Say-on-Pay votes.238 In a terse
following comment the court stated, “Cincinnati Bell is one of those companies,” signaling that it considered the shareholders’ negative vote as evidence of misconduct.239
C. Beazer Homes
A Georgia trial court, however, has dismissed a similar shareholder
suit.240 The case involved Beazer Homes USA Inc. (Beazer), whose four
most highly compensated executives received pay raises even though the
company suffered a $34 million loss and a -17.23% share price return for
fiscal year 2010.241 That continued in a three-year pattern of poor performance, during which Beazer lagged behind peer companies.242 Yet the
firm’s CEO received total remuneration of $6,893,362 in 2010, up approximately $450,000 from the previous year.243 That compensation package
drew a 54% negative Say-on-Pay vote at the company’s annual meeting of
shareholders in February 2011.244
In reporting the vote, Beazer stated: “[o]ur core compensation objective continues to be that we will pay for performance—we believe that we
should pay higher compensation when our management team succeeds
and lower compensation when it does not.”245 Yet the company went on to
justify the greater pay in 2010 by citing “the highly unique set of circumstances facing the Company at the start and during most of fiscal 2009.”246
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Beazer also explained the jump in pay by noting that the executives’ compensation had been frozen for some time, that their bonuses had been reduced in recent years, and that no equity awards had been made to them in
the last two years.247
According to the Company’s 2010 proxy, however, Beazer was under
criminal and civil investigations by the Department of Justice that precluded it from offering such equity-based grants.248 Since the company’s
top officials were presumably responsible for those potential law violations, shareholders, as evidenced by their negative vote, may well have felt
that Beazer’s leaders suffered no injustice in being deprived of those
awards and there was no need that the awards be given now.
Beazer was an egregious situation of unearned compensation, and management’s justifications for it were disingenuous. The company’s shareholders therefore quite logically signaled their disapproval. Yet in contrast
to the Cincinnati Bell decision, the Beazer Court refused to excuse pre-suit
demand, finding that the complaint failed to allege particularized facts
raising doubt that “the challenged compensation decisions were made in
good faith and in [sic] directors’ honest belief that the decisions were in
Beazer’s best interests.”249 In other words, according to the Court, the allegations had not raised “a reasonable doubt that the Beazer directors’ decisions ... reflected valid business judgments.”250 The Beazer Court also
supported its decision by noting that Delaware law had long granted “wide
discretion” to boards to set executive compensation and Dodd-Frank had
specifically preserved that “fiduciary duty framework concerning directors’ executive compensation decisions.”251
247
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X. SAY-ON-PAY’S BROADER IMPACT ON THE NATIONAL ECONOMY
According to a recent survey of investors, executive pay continues to
be one of their top concerns—particularly when that remuneration is significantly higher than peer levels and disproportionate to the company’s
performance.252 Suits against boards for authorizing excessive compensation therefore will continue, bolstered by the Cincinnati Bell decision,
which cites negative Say-on-Pay votes as prime evidence of such a breach
of fiduciary duty.
Facing such a specter of potential liability, one commentator starkly
advised that directors might finally “sit down and do the math.”253 Up until
now, he noted, they have not been evaluating what options-awards might
cost the company when the stock price goes up.254 Even more significantly,
he said, directors “who typically owe their position on the board to the chief
executive”255 might finally have a countervailing incentive to do their job
and check their top executives’ demands for exorbitant compensation.
Underlying this legal change is the moral sense that these huge executive
pay packages are a grave injustice, a real theft of our productive resources.
All religious traditions condemn the evil that results when great wealth is misappropriated, and American history is full of lessons that we all rise or fall
together as a people. As President Kennedy put it, “[i]f a free society cannot
help the many who are poor, it cannot save the few who are rich.”256
Closely related to the misuse of corporate wealth by excessive compensation is the equally troubling phenomenon of corporations hoarding large
amounts of cash and not distributing those funds to shareholders or putting
them to other productive uses.257 Two trillion dollars of these funds currently
lie in corporate treasuries, with firms showing little interest in spending them
to create jobs for workers258 that would spur economic recovery.259 In addition, the revival of the American manufacturing base requires expenditures
in science, engineering, and technology.260 With debt issues paramount in
252

INST. S’HOLDER SERVS., INC., 2011–2012 POLICY SURVEY SUMMARY OF RESULTS
(2011), http://www.issgovernance.com/files/PolicySurveyResults2011.pdf.
253
Sherter, supra note 103 (quoting GMI senior research associate, Paul Hodgson).
254
Id.
255
Id.
256
President John F. Kennedy, Address at the Presidential Inauguration (Jan. 20, 1961).
257
See Becky Yerak, Sitting Tight on Big Cushions, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 25, 2011, at Sec. 2
p.1.
258
Rana Foroohar, Don’t Hold Your Breath, TIME (June 8, 2011), http://www.time
.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2076568,00.html.
259
Tom Campbell, Hiring Would Spur Recovery, SPOKESMAN REV., Aug. 25, 2011, at O2.
260
See Susan Hockfield, Op-Ed., Manufacturing a Recovery, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2011,
at A23.

34

WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4:001

Washington, experts expect a 10% cut in federal grants for research and
development,261 making private sector spending even more imperative.
In short, the underuse of firm resources, along with their blatant misuse by excessive executive compensation, is robbing companies and their
shareholders of funds that should be working to expand the profitable capacities of the nation and giving productive work to its citizens. As a leading treatise on corporate governance puts it when discussing the proper
purposes of those firms, “[t]he accountability we still seek ... is that which
is most likely to result in corporate choices that best benefit society over
the long term.”262
A prime example of that beneficial attitude comes from one of the
great geniuses of American business, Henry Ford. By the second decade
of the 20th century, Ford’s Motor Company had already become quite
profitable.263 Ford planned to use some of those funds as a reserve so he
could lower the price of his cars, but some of his early shareholders, the
Dodge brothers, objected.264 They sued Ford, charging that they were getting insufficient dividends. Ford offered this defense of his business plan:
“[m]y ambition ... is to employ still more men; to spread the benefits of
this industrial system to the greatest possible number, to help them build
up their lives and their homes. To do this, we are putting the greatest share
of our profits back into the business.”265 This defense of his business plan
was in line with Ford’s oft-stated aspiration to pay everyone who worked
at his plant well enough to purchase one of the cars they helped make.266
The court however seemed to find Ford’s rhetoric too philanthropic. In
holding that Ford must pay more dividends to the Dodge Brothers it stated,
“[t]here should be no confusion .... A business corporation is organized
and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders.”267 Yet the
court also acknowledged the discretion that the law would allow to directors to accomplish that purpose.268 If Ford had thus justified his pricereduction policies as a way of creating a permanent market for his product,
the result would most likely have been different. His statement about the
broader corporate purposes would then have been very acceptable when
261
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seen as creating wide desire for a product that only well-paid consumers
could satisfy.269
The need for such broad based buyer demand is even greater today
when our nation’s recovery staggers along. As economist Robert Reich
stated, “The economy cannot possibly get out of its current doldrums
without a strategy to revive the purchasing power of America’s vast middle class.”270 Economic growth will thus come when corporate funds are
used for job-creating investments, rather than hoarded or lavishly paid out
to overcompensated executives.
CONCLUSION
Cases like Citigroup and Cincinnati Bell are evidence of a renewed judicial willingness to find boards of directors liable for breaches of their
fiduciary duty if they have granted overly generous pay hikes to top officials. This may be particularly so when shareholders have stated their disapproval of those awards by negative Say-on-Pay votes, especially when
those lush raises have been granted despite losses and in derogation of
corporate policy that executive pay be based on performance.
Although the negative Say-on-Pay votes are not legally binding on
boards, they are nevertheless probative evidence that directors have violated their duty to act in the best interest of their shareholders. Courts can
act with rulings that will send a much-needed message to boards that they
must curb excessive pay packages for top management. Then, by distributing those funds to shareholders or putting them to other productive uses,
business leaders can roll back some of the outlandish income inequality
that is plaguing our nation.
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Most recently a new business form has been established by the laws of several states—
the Benefit Corporation. It allows a company to explicitly embrace a dual purpose, profitability, and other more altruistic goals that further the public good. By putting potential
shareholders on notice that it may have other motives in addition to profit maximization, a
corporation can shelter its altruistic leaders from shareholder suits such as Dodge v. Ford.
See Stephen J. Haymore, Public(ly Oriented) Companies: B Corporations and the Delaware
Stakeholder Provision Dilemma, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1311, 1313 (2011); Rakhi I. Patel,
Facilitating Stakeholder-Interest Maximization: Accommodating Beneficial Corporations
in the Model Business Corporation Act, 23 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 135, 140–41 (2010).
Along the same lines, former Vice President and environmental activist Al Gore has recently created a blueprint for what he calls “sustainable capitalism” which would lead companies away from “irresponsible short-term investment.” Sinead Cruise, Al Gore Takes
Aim at “Unsustainable” Capitalism, REUTERS (Feb. 16, 2012, 1:19 PM), http://www.reuters
.com/article/2012/02/16/sustainablecapitalism-idUSL5E8DG45E20120216.
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